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ABSTRACT 
The purpose or this study was to assess the independent and combined 
effects or choice, sex, outcome (success and failure), and task on 
attribution of causality. The independent variables which were 
manipulated were choice, outcome, and task. The dependendent variables 
were attribution of causality, level of perceived responsibility and 
importance. 
The four hypotheses which were examined in the study were: 
1. When succeeding at a task and when given a choice among tasks to perform men will attribute causality internally while women will 
attribute causality externally. 
2. When failing at a given task and when given a choice among tasks perform women will attribute causality internally while men will 
attribute causality externally. 
3. For all individuals (regardless of sex) opportunity to choose 
among choice alternatives is more important than succeeding or fail:ing at a task. 
4. When receiving no choice among choice alternatives, individuals 
will perceive choice as being more important than outcome. 
The research project was conducted in a laboratory on the campus of 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, during a seven week period in 
1987. One hundred introductory Social Psychology students acted as 
experimental subjects as part of the course requirement. The subjects 
were assigned to one of twelve possible experimental conditions which 
were predetermined as per the number of possible combinations of the 
independent variables. 
Analysis of the data indicated that none of the hypotheses were 
supported. First, it was found that choice did not cause significant 
differences in attribution between men and women. Second, it was found 
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that choice was not more important than outcome to subjects. While 
significant results were found for the level of responsibility variable 
these results are in line with previous research findings. 
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I. Introduction 
To choose or not to choose, that is the question. In this ever 
changing and vastly complex society or ours we are continually bombarded 
with the oppurtunity to choose among different alternatives. The choices 
cover the spectrum of lite experiences from the most simple to the most 
complex. Choice behavior encompasses the most simple decisions such as 
what toothpaste we use to the most complex decisions like whom we choose 
to marry. Daily, we are faced with choices such as what clothing to wear 
to work, where to eat lunch etc. With the concept of choice playing such 
an important part in our lives, it is very important to explore its 
conceptualizations as well as its boundries. Before we proceed further, 
it would seem appropriate at this point to actually describe what choice 
is. 
In its most practical sense, choice is recognition of and or selection 
among two or more alternatives. In the past, the variable of choice was 
used to manipulate the experience of control in a wide variety of 
settings including those of reactance (e.g. Brehm and Sensenig!, 1966), 
control over aversive stimuli (e.g. Corah and Boffa, 1970), the illusion 
of control (e.g. Langer, 1975) and attribution (e.g. Jones and Harris, 
i 1967).Attribution of causality in research focuses on informing subje~ts 
about outcomes relating to their behavior (ie success or failure at task, 
win or lose at game, etc.) and having them explain the outcome of which 
they have been informed. This relationship of choice to attribution has 
been researched a number of times, which highlights the fact that choice 
has been linked with the attribution of intent and has been shown to be 
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an important variable in the assignment or responsibility. 
One or the chief purposes of this study is exploration of the direct 
relationship between choice and attribution. Another purpose of this 
study is to look for factors which interact with choice, affecting 
attribution of causality. Choice, sex of the subject and success and 
failure (outcomes) were looked at independently and jointly to assess 
their affect on attribution of causality in an initial study performed by 
Zuckerman, Larrance, Porac and Blanck (1980). In the Zuckerman et. al 
study a general assumption was that people are motivated to control the 
environment and that lack of choice is maladaptive for the individual. 
The initial purpose of that research was to examine how fear of success 
affected intrinsic motivation, choice behavior and attribution. As a side 
light, the researchers attempted to test for the interaction effects of 
choice behavior, sex of the subject, varying levels of task and outcome 
of their collective affect on attribution. Since individuals take more 
responsibility for what they choose, the possibility was entertained that 
task outcome might have a stronger affect under choice then under no 
choice conditions. 
What Zuckerman et. al. did in the study was to assign randomly choice 
or no choice and ouctome to each of the experimental subjects. The 
experimental task was a puzzle construction task. Six puzzles of medium 
difficulty were used in the study. Subjects in the choice condition were 
asked to select from among the six puzzles, three they would like to work 
on. Subjects in the no choice condition were assigned three of six 
puzzles to do. The subjects were given 10 minutes to complete each of the 
puzzles at which time the outcome manipulation was performed. In the h~gh 
. ' .... '.:, 
/· 
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performance condition (success) subjects were told that their performance 
ranked in the upper 94th percentile. If on the other hand they were in 
the low performance condition (failure), subjects were told their 
performance time ranked in the lower 32rd percentile. Following this 
manipulation, subjects were asked to attribute causality for the outcome 
of which they were informed. Three findings of interest to this proposed 
research resulted from this study. 
First, it was found that choice influenced how subjects perceived 
their performance regardless of what the performance actually was. This 
relates to the proposed project because it seems to indicate that choice 
of tasks acts as more of a motivator for perception of success or failure 
then the outcome actually does. The second finding which was of 
importance study was that subjects in the choice condition made more 
internal attributions for the outcomes of which they were informed. This 
finding seems to indicate that the level of perceived responsibility for 
the outcome was highest when the choice of tasks was given to the 
subject. This can be tested in the proposed study by examining the effect 
that choice/no choice had on the attribution of causality. The most 
significant finding which resulted from this study was that differences 
in performance ratings were highest under choice condition. That is in 
the choice condition there were greater differences perceived between 
success and failure. There are several problems with the Zuckerman et. 
al. study. Through careful examination 3 possible questions in their 
design are noticed. First, one must ask what type of choice they were 
attempting to study? In the study itself there are two types of choice 
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which are being manipulated. These are choices made "within a task type" 
and choices made "between task types•. While attempting to study choice 
versus nochoice as one of their independent variables Zuckerman et. al. 
manipulated both of these in the experiment. The intital choice which 
Zuckerman et. al. randomly assigned to some of the subjects was a choice 
"within a task". A "within task choice" is a selection made among 
alternatives coming from the same task. A good example of this is 
selecting a series of soma puzzles of varying degrees of difficulty as 
Zuckerman et. al did. This type of choice would have been all right had 
Zuckerman et. al. given subjects different puzzles of varying difficulty. 
They did not. They used six puzzles of medium difficulty only (further 
implications of which to be discussed later in section). The point here 
is that they manipulated "within task choice". 
After the outcome manipulation they gave the subjects another choice, 
this being a "between task choice". This type of choice revolves around 
choice made between two distinct tasks. A good example would be a reading 
task versus a physical labor task. In this Zuckerman et. al. 
conceptualization, a subject was allowed to read a magazine or to do more 
puzzles. But what type of choice were Zuckerman et. al.'s subjects were 
responding to on the attribution dependent measure. Both of the choice 
manipulations were made before the subjects made their attribution of 
causality. Maybe these choice types operated independently or 
interactively, but this was not tested. Becaus·e of their implementation 
just prior to the dependent questionnaire, this question must be raised. 
The second question in the Zuckerman et. al. design had to do with the 
task difficulty of the stimulus tasks. Since it is reported in past 
6 
research that a small but different level of attractiveness between 
choice options is needed to produced perceived choice (Harvey and 
Johnstone, 1973; Kidd and Harvey, 1974), use of 6 tasks of the same 
difficulty causes the results to be questioned. That is, one must 
question the amount of perceived choice which this study created. The 
final question about the Zuckerman et. al. study has to do with the 
outcome manipulation which they used. In their study they manipulated the 
individual's perception of success or failure indirectly; that is 
subjects were not told dirrectly that they had succeeded or failed. They 
were only informed that their performance ranked in the 94th percentile 
(success) or that their performance ranked in the 32nd percentile 
(failure)? The problem with this type of manipulation is that it allows a 
subjective inference by the subject. How do we know that the 94th 
percentile means success to an indivdual as well as a 32nd percentile 
' 
means failure. Therefore it seems neccessary to directly manipulate 
success or failure. The proposed study looks at choice independently, 
and in conjunction with sex and outcome to assess their affects on 
attribution. While Zuckerman et. al set the precedent for the study 
itself, this study will attempt to remedy the apparent defects. 
While the differences are now clear between Zuckerman et. al. and my 
own study, I must give them credit for establishing the precedent. 
Although they did not set out to test the interaction in question as the 
main emphasis of their study, the fact remain that they created the 
design initially. Of note is the fact is even though they did mention 
testing for this 3 way interaction, nothing was reported about it in the 
7 
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results section. One could assume based on this ract that their results 
were not significant or that no real interaction exists. 
II. History- Past research in attribution theory has had many 
contributors but two of the most important to my thesis are Fritz Heider 
and Bernard Weiner. Both of these individuals' theoretical constructs 
played a major role in this body of information and for this reason this 
next section shall address their contributions to {a) attribution 
research at large and (b) my own work. 
A. Fritz Heider- The first notable ground work for today's 
attribution research was seen in Fritz Reider's book entitled "The 
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations" (1958). In the book, Heider 
formulated a model called the "P-0-X balance model" which helps to 
explain attribution. The model itself focused on causal explanations for 
hypothetical outcomes which were given to subjects. It was based in two 
parts. The first part of the model is composed of three entities 
(P:person, O=other and X:outcome), while the later part of the model is 
based on two types of relations (Attitudes and Unit) between the 
entities. An example of an attitude relation is something that a persons 
likes or dislikes while an example of a unit relation is something which 
is "of me" or "not of me". The key element of this theoretical construct 
has to do with setting the model in balance; that is, balancing the model 
so that all three of the entities either "relate" to each other 
positively, or two of the entities are negative while the remaining 
entity is positive. The relationship of this to attribution is twofold. 
The first relationship has to do with the valence of the unit relations; 
that is the difference in "attributionalitY" between positive and 
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negative unit outcomes. This is analyzing that old adage~ people want 
accept responsiblity for good while blaming external sources for bad". 
attribution of causality and unit relations were directely related, the 
distinction between the usage of the two as a means to place 
responsibilty be clear cut. If an outcome was positive it would be 
attributed internally, while if an outcome was negative it would be 
attributed externally. 
Theoretically this is the way that attribution should work according 
to the model. In reality, attribution theorists know that this is not 
to 
It 
always the case. If it were, each time a negative outcome occured. we 
could predict that a person would attibute causality externally, while 
given a positive outcome that same person would attribute causality 
internally. People often blame themseleves for negative outcomes while 
attributing a positive outcome to an exteral factor. This is exactly the 
point at which the second part of Reider's theory is necessary. 
According to Reider's theory, 1 other factor needs to be taken into 
account before an attribution of causality can be made. This factor has 
to do with the concepts "can" and "try". "Can" means a person has the 
ability to cause "x" while "try" focuses on whether the person intended 
to get "x" to happen and did he exert himself to get "x outcome" to 
occur. Heider contends that both "can" and "try" are neccessary for an 
action to be completed. Personal force was conceived to involve ability 
(can in Heider's conception) and motivation (try). Heider suggests that 
people are very sensitive to the extent to which can and try are involved 
in a person's behavior. Heider theorized the specific components of "can" 
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are ability and power. Try according to Heider, has both a Directional 
component (what a person intends to do) and a Quantitative component (how 
hard a person is trying to do something). There would be 4 potential 
combinations of attributions keeping "can" and "try" in mind. These are: 
1. Can+ Try---> leading to a success= internal attribution 
2. Can+ Try---> leading to a failure= external attribution 
3. Cannot+ Not Trying---> leading to success= external 
attribution 
4. Cannot + Not Trying -> leading to failure = 
internal attribution. 
Talcing into consideration the constructs listed above, Heider would say 
weshould be able to predict what the subject would attribute causality to 
in the future given all the same circumstances. If one had the ability to 
do "x" (can), if he/she attempted to do "x" and if we know the outcome, 
then given the same conditions in the future we should be able to predict 
to what causality will be attributed. This is just not the case. Given 
two identical situations the same outcome could be attributed 
differently. Take for example a victory in a basketball game. In one 
instance, an individual hits the winning basket at the end of a game. The 
following day in a local tabloid the victory is attributed to his ability 
and effort (supported by leading the league in scoring); that is he had 
the ability to hit the winning shot and he attempted the shot. Two weeks 
later, the same situation arises and the same result occurs yet the next 
day the local tabloid attributes the victory to luck (in the 2 weeks 
prior to the outcome the individual had been in a shooting slump). Since 
the person's ability did not change, something occured during the passage 
of time which changed the can to cannot. Even though the person tried to 
make the shot the attribion of cauality was made to some external 
10 
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source. Because of the passage of time extraneous factors have come into 
play in the attribution proccess which affected the new attribution (in 
this particular case maybe the athlete went into a shooting slump). What 
this does is to identify a problem which Heider's Model has; that is even 
though the skill level of the indivdual did not change time passage 
effected its causal attribution "usefulness". Although I chose basketball 
as an example any circumstance in life can be affected by the passage of 
time in a similar fashion. This suggests to me that Heider did not go far 
enough in his theoretical construct. There seems to be some other factor 
involved; that is some factor seems to be an extraneous variable in the 
situation. Given two identical situations some other factor seems to 
influence what individuals attribute causality to. Taking a hint from 
Zuckerman et. al. I believe that choice or lack or choice may be the 
extraneous variable in question. 
B. Bernard Weiner-In early work, Weiner and his colleagues (1972) 
hypothesized that people infer casuality about a stimulus person's 
success or failure on the basis of four factors. These factors are; what 
the person's perceived ability is at the task, how much effort they 
expended on the task, how diffucult the task was and how much luck 
influenced the outcome. Ability and effort were considered internal to 
the person while task difficulty and luck were considered external to the 
person. Ability and task difficulty wereconsidered stable determinants of 
a person's character while luck and effort were considered unstable 
determinants of a person's character. In the P-0-X Model, when receiving 
positive outcomes individual's tend attribute causality internally while 
attributing negative outcomes externally. In the Weiner et al. Model, the 
11 
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P-0-X Model is tested more thoroughly; that is, while Heider proposed~ 
possible dimensions along which attributions could be made in the 
experimental setting it was not until Weiner et. al. that they were 
really tested thoroughly. Hore specifically, this model hypothesizes that 
two components of the model (ability and effort) describe the 
qualitiesundertaking the activity, while the two remaining components 
(task difficulty and luck) can be considered properties external to the 
person or enviormental factors. If both of the above mentioned 
theoretical constructs are correct, then in any success situation there 
should have been a higher tendency for people to attribute causality to 
internal sources (such as ability or effort) while in any failure 
situation there should have been a higher tendency for people to 
attribute causality to external sources (such as task difficulty or 
luck). 
While this does hold for some in~tances of attribution, it is again 
not an absolute. In some instances when given a success outcome 
individuals will attribute causality externally while in some failure 
. instances individuals will attribute causality internally (Campbell and 
Racket, 1986; Frieze, 1981; Feather, 1969;Nicholls, 1975). Thus, while 
both models do hold true for some instances, in others they do not. 
Therefore, there must be some other influence on the success/failure 
manipulation, and attribution causal chain. 
III. Present research findings in area- Since the context of the 
problem I am studying lies in the attribution, choice, sex, success and 
failure relationship, the factors which I am hypothesizing arfect this 
relationship must be defined. The two key factors in which I am intereted 
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are sex differences in attribution of casuality and choice or no choice 
at a task. In this next section of the review I will discuss each of 
these areas (a) procedures, problems, findings and (b) their relationship , 
to my hypotheses. 
A. Sex Differences in Attribution of Causality- What I am proposing 
in the hypotheses is that men and women will attribute the same outcome 
to different sources. Comparison of the relevant past and present 
findings indicate that the results available are mixed at best. While a 
large body of research indicates that men and women of all ages make some 
what different causal attributions for outcomes (Frieze, 1981), many of 
the findings are contradictory; that is, 1 study will indicate 1 
direction of attribution while a direct replication of it will be 
different. 
1. Findings which follow stereotypically held views about sex 
differences in attribution- In a study by Nicholls (1975), it was 
hypothesized that "since expectancies are held to reflect causal 
attributions (Weiner,1972), it was anticipated that sex differences in 
attribution might occur (Feather,1969) and help account for differences 
in expectancies". This study itself was developed as a result of Reider's 
"Naive Analysis of action" and of previous findings by Weiner and his 
associates. The study was formulated to apply to situations in which 
subjects are inferring the causes of outcomes of their own behavior not 
imagined outcomes or imagined behavior. Two findings of interest resulted 
from this study. The first finding of interest was that girls but not 
boys, attributed failure to poor ability (internal,stable) more than 
13 
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success to good ability. The second finding of was boys, more than 
girls, attributed failure to bad luck (external, stable). 
... ,·. < 
In the Zuckerman, Larrance, Porac and Blanck study (1980), research was 
continued which explored a previous Zuckerman and Allison finding (1976). 
This finding was "that females had a higher fear of success score than 
did males andthat subjects (both male and female) with higher fear of 
success scores performed worse at an Anagram Task". It was found that the 
subjects who did worse attibuted success more to external factors and 
failure more to internal factors. While examining the extent to which 
fear of success moderates effect of choice and task outcomes on intrinsic 
motivation, causal attribution and subsequent choice behavior, two 
significant results supporting my study were found. First, males made 
more stable attributions (ability, task) under success than under failure 
whereas females made less stable attributions (luck,effort). The other 
finding was that males made more unstable attributions (luck,effort) 
under failure than under success whereas females made more stable 
attributions (ability, effort). 
In the Campbell and Hackett study (1986), subjects were exposed to 
success or failure experiences on a series of three verbal tasks. The 
purpose of the study was to continue the line of experimental research 
conducted by Hackett and Betz (1984) and continued by Hackett and 
Campbell (1985). It was hypothesized in the study that task success or 
failure would interact with gender resulting in differential self 
evaluations of performance on the part of men and women. One key finding 
which resulted from this study was that women who were successful were 
more likely than men to see their successes as due to luck. 
14 
In the Frieze Chapter (1981), childrens' attributions to success and 
failure were examined. In the review, the author stated, •it appears that 
quit young children are able to form meaningful causal attributions and 
that those attributions function in the same way that they do in adults•. 
While not a direct laboratory study, this review proposes that because of 
the numerous findings in the sex difference area, a sex/causal 
attribution relationship must exist. It is stated, that "relevant data 
indicates that females of all ages are more likely to attribute their 
successes to unstable and external factors such as luck and task ease". 
Also stated is the fact that "females are less likely to see their 
successes as caused by ability and make more attributions to lack of 
ability for failure (eq., Bar Tal and Frieze, 1977; Dweck and Reppuci, 
1973; McMahan, 1973; Nicholls, 1975; Simon and Feather,1973; Weigers and 
Frieze,1977). All of these findings are suggesting that a 
sex/outcome/attribution relationship exists for females. Although not 
stated in these finding, I am assuming the opposite holds true for males. 
Feather and Simon (1974), sought to assess whether there exists a 
relationship between the variables of fear of success and how a person 
attributes causality for success at a simple task performance. It was 
predicted initially that there would be a tendency for persons to 
attribute expected outcomes to stable factors which are assumed to 
underlie these outcomes whereas unexpected outcomes would be explained in 
terms of variable factors that have minimal weight in influencing initial 
expectations of success. The finding which is of most importance to the 
proposed hypothesesis that female subjects who succeeded at the task 
15 
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attributed the success to task ease. This is saying that women who 
succeeded at the task were more likely to attibute that success to 
external sources. 
In the Feldman-Summers and Kiesler study (1974), the purpose of the 
research was to explore the effects of sex role stereotypes on the 
attribution process. Inasmuch as experimentally created expectations of 
success substantially affected attributions of causality, then widely 
accepted expectations about men and women may also effect causal 
attributions. In the experiment, male and female subjects were asked to 
make causal attributions concerning the performances of other males and 
females. The subjects were given an opportunity to attribute causality 
along the four dimensions proposed in the Weiner et al Model (1971). It 
was predicted that success by men would be attributed more to their 
ability than success by women and attributions for women's successes 
would rest relatively more on one or more of the other 3 directions. 
Several findings were of interest. First, it was found that high ability 
(stable, internal) was used more often as an explanation for male 
success. The other finding of interest is that luck (unstable,external) 
was used more often to explain female success. 
2. Findings which contradict previously mentioned findings about 
attributions- In a study by Feather (1969), an attempt was made to 
clarify the conditions that influence the way in which a he/she assigns 
responsibility for succeeding or failing-at a task. The chief aim of the 
study was to explore in either a success or failure situation what 
factors determine whether he/she attributes the outcome to self 
(internal) or enviornment (external). The finding in this study of 
16 
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interest waa tamales attributed success to good luck and failure at a 
task to bad luck. As one can tell, .it was round that in women both 
successes and failures led to external attributions (what must be noted 
here is that no significant differences were found for men in the 
attributions made to both success or failure). This finding seems to 
disconfirm the idea of a sex/outcome based attributional hypothesis. If 
there exists a true correlation between the variables of sex, outcome and 
attribution then for example, success by a female would be externally 
attributed while a failure would be attributed internally for any 
particular outcome. In this study, females were as likely as males to 
attribute a success or failure to luck. 
Could it be that there was some sort of bias in this study which 
confounded the sex, outcome attribution chain? While the study 
communicates male and female differences in attribution, it does not 
state how much; that is were males highly internal in attribution as 
compared to females under success, failure or both conditions? One must 
wonder why the authors did not report the findings for the males. 
In the Bar Tal and Frieze study (1976), the chief emphasis of the 
research was to explore the actor/observer phenomena in attribution 
research; that is when an actor tends to attribute his or her behavior to 
situational factors (external) while an observer of the same behavior 
. 
tends to perceive it as a result of stable personal characteristics of 
the actor (internal). The study itself investigated some of the 
differences in attribution made by actors and observers in achievement 
situations. It was hypothesized in this study that female actors would be· 
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expected to do less well by male and female observers and therefore, the 
observers would be less likely to attribute female actors'successes to 
their abilities. It was also hypothesized that observer differences in 
atttribution made about male and female actors would be stronger for male 
than female observers. The finding which is of interest to me is that 
women overall attributed their own and women actors outcomes more to luck 
{external,unstable). These results are diffcult to understand in light of 
earlier findings. 
Feather and Simon study (1971), assessed the degree to which a person 
attributes responsibility for an outcome to ability or luck depends 
upon the initial expectation of success under condition ofsuccess or 
failure. A person's specific expectation of success at a task would be 
largely a function of both his relatively stable estimates of his ability 
and of his perceptions of task difficulty (determined by situational 
characteristics and performance of others). It was hypothesized that 
successful outcomes will be more attractive then unsuccessful outcomes, 
that successful outcomes will be more attracive when initial expectations 
of success are low than when they are high and that unsuccessful outcomes 
will be more unattractive when initial expectations of success are high 
then when they are low. The finding from this research which is of 
relevance to my study is that females did not have higher attribution 
scores than males (they were not more external in their attribution 
scores than were males). The results reported in this study are contrary 
to what was found in an earlier study by Feather (1969). Since the second 
study was a systematic replication of the first, one or both of the 
studies' findings must be questioned. The differences which occured in 
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the studies are very clear. In the 1969 study, mixed sex pairs were used 
and it was made clear that the attributions would be made public. In the 
1971 study, same sex pairs were used and the attributions themselves were 
private. The difference between both studies is that different sex pairs 
(same vs mixed) and different levels of social awareness (low versus 
high) created different attributions. This finding contributes again to 
my study because it demonstrates the breadth of findings in the field; 
that is, changing experimental group and stimuli can affect attribution. 
In the Crandall, Katovsky and Preston study (1962), the basic aim of 
the investigation was to assess the relations between a number of 
predictor variables and children's intellectual achievement behaviors in 
several achievement situations. The predictor varible of interest to me 
was a child's belief that he, rather than other person's usually caused 
the successes and failure he experienced in intellectual achievement 
situations. It was felt that whether children believe reinforcements of 
their intellectual achievement behaviors (success and failure) are the 
result of their own instrumental efforts or come from the actions of 
others may affect the impact which such experiences have on them and may 
ultimately influence the intensity and quality of their achievement 
efforts. In other words children appear to assimilate the effect of given 
social reinforcment differently according to their assumptions of whether 
they or others are _the major causal agents of these reinforcements. The 
major hypothesis of this study was that differences in achievement 
motivation exist in young children which result from the hypothesized 
predictor variables. 
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The finding which is or interest is that girls attributed causality 
internally for both successes and failure (tor the motivational 
variables)while boys differed in attribution or causality for successes 
and failures. This finding is relevant to my study because it says that 
girls, independentof outcome, will attribute causality in the same 
direction. While previously mentioned studies found that female subjects 
attributed causality externally for both successes and failures, this one 
found that girls attributed causality for success and failure internally. 
One obvious difference between this study and others is the sample it is 
using is children as compared to the other studies in which 
the populations are collge students. Maybe age differences (since this 
study was looking at children at different developmental ages) account 
for the internal/external attribution differences between this study and 
the others. Again these results are important because they demonstrate 
that there exists mixed results in the sex, and outcome effects on 
attribution. 
In the Deaux and Emswiller study (1974) , the authors had found 
previously that in equivalent situations in which obserevers had to rate 
both males and female performances, males' performances tend to be rated 
more favorably than the females' (Goldberg, 1968; Pheterson, Kiesler and 
Goldberg, 1971; and Deuax and Tatnor, 1973). From the attributional point 
of view one might question whether the observer attaches ident1cal causes 
to equivalent performances by male actors and female actors. Feather 
(1969), found a greater tendency for females to use external attributions 
in explaining the performance. Furthermore subjects of both sexes show 
greater use of external explanations as opposed to internal when their 
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successes or failures is unexpected rather than expected. Weiner et al. 
(1971), round that if subjects expectations ror the actor's performance 
was high, the actor's subsequent successes tended to be attributed to 
ability; if the expectation was low, a success was more likely to be 
attributed to luck or effort. What was done in this experiment was to 
select "stereotypical male" and "stereotypical female" tasks for the 
study. The author's theorized that performance on a sex linked task 
should be more readily attributed to internal factors such as ability or 
effort whereas on a sex inconsistent task performance should be more 
often attributed to external factors such as chance. The researcher 
proposed two hypotheses, the results of which are of importance to my 
study. First they proposed that when subjects perform strictly male 
tasks, men should attribute internally (skill) while females should 
attribute externally (luck). When subjects perform strictly female tasks, 
males should attribute externally (luck) and females should attribute 
internally (skill). The finding which is of most interest to my studyis 
that male's and female's performances (both successes and failures) were 
attributed to luck by the outside observer (for the tasks that were 
catagorized as strictly fenale in nature). This result adds to the number 
of contradictory findings which exist in this area. 
Looking at this range of results demonstrates that there exists some 
sort of relationship among choice, sex, outco~e, and attribution of 
causality. Because of the variablity of the findings, it maybe that the 
correct intervening variable which will tie this relationship together is 
not being addressed. I believe that the Zuckerman, Larrance, Porac and 
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Blank study (1980), has identified this variable. Following then, I am 
proposing that choice or lack or choice is the critical intervening 
variable in the sex, outcome, attribution causal chain. 
The relevant findings about choice behavior will be discussed next. 
B. Choice/No choice- I am suggesting that giving or not giving a 
subject choice among task alternatives will influence to what a subject 
attributes the outcome he/she experiences. Secondarily I assert that 
choice is more important to subjects than outcome. Research findings 
available are mixed at best, so I will next discuss both supportive and 
disconfirming findings for the above stated positions. 
1. Choice influenced to what subjects attributed causality- In 
the Kidd and Harvey study (1974), the main focus of the study was on the 
determinants of perceived choice. The researchers sought to replicate the 
finding of Harvey and Johnstone (1973), that there exist differences in 
perceived choice which are determined by the size of the difference 
between choice alternatives. While focusing on this size difference, an 
attempt was made to explore attributions of causality associated with 
perceived choice. It was predicted that in conditions which produce high 
perceived choice, (ie when there is a small difference in attractiveness) 
individuals would attribute the basis for their decision to personal 
preference (an internal factor). On the other hand, in conditions which 
produce low perceived choice (ie when there is either no or a large 
difference between choice alternatives) individuals would base their 
decision on luck (external factors). The findings of the study supported 
both of these positions; that is subjects with a small difference between 
choice alternatives attributed their selection to personal preference 
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(internal), while subjects with a large or no difference attributed their 
choice to luck (external). 
These findings are of interest because I am hypothesizing that choice 
along choice along with sex and outcome will influence direction of 
attribution. Interpreting what perceived choice and nonperceived choice 
are can lend support to my hypotheses; that is, hypothetically speaking 
an individual should perceive a choice if given a choice rather than if 
not given a choice at all. Those who would receive a choice would be more 
likely to attribute internally, while those who did not receive a choice 
would be more likely to attribute externally. 
In the Harrison, Lewis and Straka study (1984), the chief interest of 
the study was to explore the perception of control which individuals 
have. People believing they have control over the likelihood of 
experiencing reinforcement outcomes were referred to as internals; 
persons who ascribe this control to chance, fate or powerful others are 
termed externals. At its most fundamental, the perception of choice is a 
belief that two or more courses of action are possible. Although the 
relative outcomes of the possible actions probably influence the 
perception of choice, the critical feature is the recognition of 
alternative courses of action. The purpose of this study was twofold. 
First, the researchers wanted to explore the notion that under conditions 
of freedom of choice internals will experience more satisfaction with an 
undesirable task than will externals. Second, the research explored 
satisfaction in general, hypothesizing that perceived choice will be 
more fulfilling to internals than externals. The finding which is of 
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interest to my study is that the opportunity to choose is more important 
to internals than externals. 
One other finding from this study has some implications for my study. 
Those subjects who did not perceive as much choice were less likely to 
accept responsibility for the outcome (external), while those who 
perceived a choice were more likely to accept responsiblity for the 
outcome {internal). Thus assessing the level of responsibility is 
important. 
In the Kail study (1975), the relationship between the amount of 
freedom given to a subject choosing a task and subsequent performance and 
persistance at the task were investigated. Presumably after an individual 
has freely chosen a task he/she will be more committed to the task than 
an individual who is forced to perform that task. The hypothesis of 
interest which was tested in this research was that subjects who 
persisted longer at the task would be the subjects who were given a 
choice among task alternatives to perform. The data collected in this 
study found that subjects who were more persistent at the task were the 
ones who were given a choice among tasks to perform but were not 
neccesarily successful at the task. To the authors of the study, choice 
is more of a motivating (important) factor in task performance than 
success or failure. This is exactly in the direction that I am 
hypothesizing. 
In the Luginbuhl study (1972), the relationship between choice and 
attribution of responsibility was investigated. Having a choice amoung 
task alternatives might result in a feeling of being at ease, of the 
individual feeling himself to be the source responsible for a particular 
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outcome. Having a choice may affect ones feelings of success and 
competence. A consequence of choice may be a feeling of having influenced 
one's fate, or exercising control over outcomes. Success at a problem for 
which no choice is possible can only be attributed to one's own ability 
since selection of the task was not under one's control. Failure at a 
problem which one has chosen may result in greater feelings of inadequacy 
than failure at a non chosen problem. When one succeeds the desire may be 
to attribute the success internally but having had a prior choice makes 
attribution difficult. When one fails the desire is to attribute the 
failure to external sources but given a prior choice makes attribution 
difficult; that is choice of tasks causes a person's perceived level of 
responsibility to rise. Thus even though a subject may have failed his 
having received a choice (increased level of responsibility) makes 
attribution of causality more complex. Keeping all of these ideas in 
mind, the researchers hypothesized that self attributed ability 
(internal) will be greatest following a randomly assigned difficult task, 
next greatest following a randomly assigned medium task and the least 
greatest following following a randomly assigned easy task. The two major 
findings which are of importance are that subjects would choose to work 
on a problem which they considered easiest, and self attributed ability 
(internal) will be greatest following an assigned difficult task. 
2. Findings which indicate that choice does not affect 
attribution- In the Thompson and Wankel study (1980), the major purpose 
of the study was to investigate the effect of perceived activity choice 
~ 
upon the frequency of exercise behavior of adult women. The research was f 
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undertaken to extend the body ot research available on the etteota ot 
perceived control in a real lite setting. It was demonstrated previously 
that perceived control has an important influence upon behavior and 
psychological adjustment (Seligman, 1977; Wortman and Brehm, 1975). 
Within the area of perceived control, choice alternatives have been 
identified as one important factors having an influence upon it. Two 
branches of research within this larger area pertain to the effects of 
choice upon volunteers behavior in chance settings and the effects of 
choice or perceived choice upon tolerance for aversive stimuli. The 
hypothesis which was addressed in this study was that choice of activity 
and in training patterns will enhance performance of an individual as 
well as stimulate the person to continue the exercise program longer. 
First, it was found that individuals who were given a choice perceived 
themselves as having a choice more than individuals who did not receive 
one. The second finding is the one which is of more importance. This 
finding is that the choice groups attendance did increase over the six 
week period. Initially, choice seemed to increase performance. Upon 
closer examination of the data, it is seen that the choice manipulation 
did not work significantly as compared to the no choice manipulation 
until the latter part of the study. The experiment was set up to have two 
choice manipulations. The results indicated that significant behavior 
differences did not occur until after the second manipulation. This 
raises doubts about the choices. The question -is why did this occur. 
Perhaps an individual needs reinforcement of a choice before perceived 
choice influences behavior. Or perhaps there was a flaw in the way the 
first manipulation was performed. Since the subjects were new to the 
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program maybe the initial choice and tour week choice were perceived 
ditferently since after tour weeks the subject is already in the exercise 
program. It would seem the exercise program in conjunction with the 
choice was the chief motivator, not the exercise program alone. This 
finding is important because it indicates that other factors seem to 
exist in conjuction with the choice variable which are 
involoved with choice/ no choice perception. 
In the Alexander and Schuldt study (1984), the focus was on self 
reinforcement and its effects on task performance and perception of 
choice. Self reinforcement has to do with a process in which a behavior 
is maintained by administering rewards to oneself whenever a selected 
goal is achieved. What the researchers wanted to assess was whether 
experimenter imposed performance standards (choice of goals) would 
influence the number of wheel turns subjects performed. Goal setting 
theory maintains that participation of choice in goal setting is thought 
not to be motivating; however it can increase performance by leading to 
greater goal acceptance on the subjects'part and by setting of higher 
goals. It was hypothesized in this study that subjects who chose goals 
would out perform subjects whose goals were exposed by the 
experimenter. First, it was found that subjects who selected goals 
performed significantly more wheel turnings than subjects who received 
experimenter imposed goals. This finding demonstrates that choice 
increases task performance. The other finding of interest is that 
subjects who chose the task to perform did not out perform (do 
significantly better at) the task than subjects who had goals that were 
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imposed. This finding demonstrates even though choice increases quantity 
or performance it does not increase quality or performance. These 
findings taken together indicate that there maybe some other motivating 
factor (such as a need to demonstrate to authority figure I can do 
better) which the no choice group acted under while the choice group did 
not (or some other extraneous or intervening variable). This result is 
also important because it explains the fact that even though people are 
told they succeeded, they still blame the the success on the task and why 
they could have felt less responsible for the outcome. Telling an 
individual that they have succeeded does not neccessarily mean that they 
will believe it. In this case choice does not enhance the quality of the 
performance only the quantity. 
Based upon the past research findings in this area, the four 
hypotheses which will be examined in this study are: 
1. When succeeding at a given task and when given a choice among 
task to perform men will attribute causality internally while 
women will attribute causality externally. 
2. When failing at a given task and when given a choice among 
tasks to perform women will attribute causality internally 
while men will attribute causality externally. 
3. For all individuals (regardless of sex) opportunity to choose 
among choice alternatives is more important than succeeding or 
failing at a task. 
4. When receiving no choice among task alternatives, individuals 
will perceive choice as being more important than the outcome. 
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IV. Methods 
A. Subjects-
1, • 
One Hundred total subjects participated in the experiment, forty 
seven of whom were male and fifty three of whom were female. Subjects 
were selected randomly by computer from an introductory Social Psychology 
course. Participation in experiments was a course requirement. All of the 
experimental data was collected over a seven week period in in the spring 
of 1987 at Lehigh University. Subjects' individual participation lasted 
for approximately one hour during which three subjects at maximum were 
exposed to the manipulations (this number was determined by the 
experimetal lab space available). Of the 100 total subjects four of the 
subjects data sets were thrown out because of possible contamination 
factors (ie in the stimulus package wrong forms collated). 
A. Instruments-
Before the construction of all of the material for the experiment 
itself, it was necessary to select the tasks which were to be used in the 
choice phase of the experiment. We wondered how tasks of different 
perceived levels of difficulty would affect attribution of causality 
independently as well as in conjunction with the other independent 
variables. For this reason we decided to use three tasks in the 
experiment. 
1. Task Selection- A pretest measure ( which was collected 
previously with an indpendent population) was used to assess how 
individuals perceived they would do as compared to "like others" at a 
series of tasks(• note: this may have been one of the problems with the 
measure since what constitutes like other for one person is not 
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necoassarily the same tor other people). A random list or tasks was used. 
The list itself encompassed a variety of tasks including changing a tire, 
fixing an engine, memorizing bible passages, shooting tree throws, etc. 
After collecting and analyzing the initial pretest it was recognized that 
practical as well as conceptual issues were neccessary to be considered 
in this task selection procedure. That is, we needed to select tasks 
which were performable in laboratory situations as well as of the same 
nature. For example, having subjects change a tire or clean a fish could 
have been a bit messy as well as impractical for experimental purposes. 
The other idea to consider was that it was highly desirable to havethe 
subjects perform the same type of tasks. That is at this time the only 
interest was in comparing physical tasks or cognitive tasks (in the 
futurea possibility exists to compare across different types tasks). 
Cognitive tasks were eventually chosen because of the relative 
similarityof the task (thinking tasks) and because of the ease of doing 
them (having someone do math problems as opposed to changing a tire). A 
list of 20 cognitive tasks was developed. This list was then distributed 
to another similar population of students. It was deceided that three 
tasks would be selected from the 20 tasks. The criterion for which of the 
3 tasks to use was how variable the responses were. Ideally, what was 
desired was to find three tasks of high, medium and low variability 
respectively. Finding three tasks like this would make selection of the 
•easY", "medium•, and "hard" tasks much simpler. Hypothetically speaking, 
the less variable the task the closer the responses should have been to 
the mean. Selecting three tasks of low, medium and high variablity would 
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increase our confidence in the meaning or the responses in the actual 
experiment. In this pretest the data indicated that word groups taak had 
the least variable response pattern and the scientific formula task had 
the most variable response pattern. The task which fell almost exactly 1n 
the middle of the other two tasks was the world capital task. Thus the 
three tasks were obtained. Now that we had selected the tasks, the actual 
measures for the task were needed. 
Ten different measures were needed for the whole experiment. 
First, three learning sheets and three corresponding test sheets were 
needed for the three tasks. The Word Group learning list (see appendix 2) 
was developed by selecting a word initially and looking up a synonym for 
it in a thesaurus. Originally 40 word pairs were selected; the list was 
reduced by selecting 20 of the 40 word pairs from a hat. The World 
Capital list (see appendix 3), was compiled from a world atlas by 
selecting 40 countries with their 40 capital cities. Again this list was 
reduced by placing a paper corresponding to all 40 in a hat and selecting 
out 20 of the papers. The Scientific Formaula list (see appendix 4) was 
taken from an organic chemistry book. Again 40 formulas were or~ginally 
selected but the number was again reduced to 20 by placing all 40 on 
sheets of paper and drawing out 20. The learning sheets for the three 
tasks were very easy to create. The learning test sheets were created in 
a similar fashion as described above. The 20 original words, countries or 
scientific formulas respectively were written·down on independent lists 
and their answers (either word, capital, or what they stood for) were 
next written down on pieces of paper, placed in a bat, selected and 
recorded (see appendix 5 ,6 or 7). 
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The experimental pretest created (see appendix 8) had a two told 
purpose. Its first purpose was identification or the·subjects. That is we 
needed to acquire information which would enable us to discriminate 
between subjects. Such information would include the sex, race and age of 
the subject. The other information which we obtained is a subjective 
estimate of how the subjects believed they would do as compared to like 
others a that the Word Group, World Capital and Word Group tasks. Putting 
this evaluation in would allow us in the analysis stage to look in many 
different directions. For instance we could see if subjects who were 
given a choice always selected the task at which they thought they would 
do the best at as compared to like others. One other analysis which we 
could perform is to test how responsible a subject felt, if they received 
a choice, selected the task they thought they could do best at and were 
told they failed at it. 
The next measure which was neccessary to create was the experimental 
post test (see appendix 9). This measure was designed to obtain 9 bits of 
information. The first two questions on the posttest questionnaire served 
several purposes; that is, they were to find out if the manipulations had 
worked initially while more importantly it was hoped that the two 
questions would act as reinforcers of the manipulations. These two 
questions asked what type of outcome the individuals had received 
(success or failure) and whether they had received a choice or not. The 
next question was the attribution question which was designed to find 
out to what the subjects attributed the success or failure outcome. A 
five point scale was used originally. Subjects were asked to attribute 
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causality to the task, errort, ability, luck or other and to explain 
their choice. The next two questions were placed on the post teat to see 
whether the manipulations had any effect on subjects' perceptions; that 
is, I thought choice interacting with outcome and possibly sex would 
affect what the subjects thought was more important {choice or 
success/failure) and how responsible they felt for the outcome. The 
next question was placed on the measure in order to find out what task 
the subject did only as a time saving purpose to myself during data 
entry. The final 3 questions (which for the time being have not been used 
in any analyses) were open ended 1 word blanks to find out how people 
felt about the outcome. 
C. Procedures-
1. Random Assignment 
Prior to entering the experimental sessions a randomization procedure 
was used to assign all of the subjects to my different experimental 
conditions. The randomization procedure was used as follows: first I used 
a random number generator in a statistical package called Epistat to 
select out 60 numbers at random between 1 and 120. This selection yielded 
60 numbers selected and 60 number not selected. Next, I placed in a hat 
2 identical sized pieces of paper, one with the word choice and one with 
the word no choice on. I decided the first paper I chose would correspond 
to the printed sixty number while the remainii:ig one would correspond to 
the unprinted 60 numbers. Choice was the paper selected from the hat. 
Thus I had 60 subjects assigned to choice category and 60 assigned to the 
no choice category. For instance if 1 corresponded to choice, then the 
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first experimental subject would receive a choice. 
Next an assignment was made for the success and failure outcome. I was 
not interested in how well the subjects actually did on the "test" they 
were given but how they were told they did. For this reason it was very 
desireable for the distribution to be equal; that is for the choice and 
no choice categories I wanted an equal distribution of the 60 successes 
and 60 failures. In order to gain these ends, I placed 30 pieces of paper 
with success written on and 30 pieces of paper with failure written on. 
As I drew a number out I wrote the correponding outcome next to the first 
choice session. I proceeded to draw the next forty nine out and record 
them for the choice sessions in the same manner. The numbers were then 
replaced and the same procedure was followed for the no choice 
experimental sessions. 
The final randomization for the tasks themselves was in a very similar 
manner. It was decided previously that 3 experimental tasks would be used 
in the research. Since we did not need worry about the cells in which the 
subjects would have a choice, this assignment only concerned the no 
choice category. This randomization was performed by taking two groups of 
8 pieces of paper and 1 group of 9 pieces of paper (each group having the 
1 of the three correponding tasks written on them) placing them in a hat 
drawing the 30 out first for the no choice/ success category, the 
replacing them and drawing 30 for the no choice/failure category. Each 
draw was subsequently recorded by the corresponding no choice /outcome 
category as one procceeded down the list. 
2. Experimental Procedures-
Prospective subjects were initially instructed to sign up on an 
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experimental registration sheet for a future experimental time. When the 
subjects initially arrived they were asked to sit in a large room which 
in the experimenter was also present. When a maximum of three subjects 
had arrived each of the subjects was placed in a similar laboratory room 
on the same floor. It was decided previously that the first subject who 
arrived would be placed in room number 308, the second and third subjects 
if there were ones in 309 and 310 respectively. When the subjects entered 
the room they found the following material placed on a table: 2 pencils, 
1 informed consent sheet and 1 pretest sheet to assertain how they 
believed they would do at the tasks as compared to like others (see 
appendix 8). The subjects were then given approximately 10 minutes in 
which to fill out these forms at which time the experimenter returned 
with the learning sheets (see appendix 2-4). 
The choice/ no choice was made prior to the subjects entering the 
room; that is, it was randomly assigned prior to the experimental 
sessions. The first experimental slot corresponded to the subject placed 
in room 308, the second and third slots corresponded to the subjects 
placed in rooms 309 and 310 respectively (if there were any). Thus as per 
randomization, subjects were given a choice among or were forced to 
perform one of the tasks. If the subject had no choice the particular 
learning sheet associated with their experimental slot was handed to 
them and the experimenter left the room (sheets did have instructions on 
them). If the subjects were given a choice, the experimenter entered the 
room and explained to them that they were receiving a choice among 3 
tasks (scientific formulas,world capials and word groups) to perform on 
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the experiment and then they made the selection. This was how the choice 
manipulation was performed. 
Subjects received approximately 10 minutes during which time they were 
to learn 20 items on the sheets. After the 10 minutes was over the 
experimenter returned to the laboratory rooms with the test sheets (see 
appendix 5-7). When the experimenter entered the rooms he collected the 
learning sheets, handed the subjects the test sheets and left (all sheets 
had instructions on them). The test phase lasted for approximately 10 
minutes after which time the experimenter returned to the rooms for the 
sheets. Upon arriving he explained to each of the subjects that he was 
taking the sheets back to the main room to check and that he would 
appreciate if they remained in their chairs until he returned. This 
explanation was added to create an air of realism to the experiment; that 
is it was desirable to have the subject believe that I was actually 
checking those sheets to see how they really did. In reality their 
outcome had been previously assigned. 
After approximately 10 minutes the experimenter returned to the 
laboratory rooms with a manila folder with the final measures in it. On 
the outside of the manila folder one of two possible statements was 
found. Either a subject was told that he had succeded at getting more of 
the task done correctly in the alloted amount of time as compared to 
"like others" who had performed this task previously or that he had 
failed to get more of the task done in the alotted amount of time as 
compared to "like others" who had performed the task previously. These 
statements were the actual outcome manipulations which were used as one 
the independent variables we were interested in studying. The final 
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instructions on the outside of the folders told the subjects to open up 
the folders, fill out the measures and return with the measures to the 
big waiting room where they first were at the beginning of the 
experiment. Most of the subjects took 5 to 10 minutes to fill out the 
measures. When all of the subjects had returned to the large room the 
experimenter administered a debriefing (see appendix 10), answered any 
questions which they may have had and then the subjects were allowed to 
leave. 
Now that everything was ready, the experiment proceeded. As the data 
was collected it was coded and entered unto the computer and the analyses 
were then performed. The analyses performed will be discussed next. 
V. Results 
Upon initial inspection of the collected data, we found it neccessary 
to identify the appropriate statistical tests for the variables in 
question; that is, we had to identify the level of analysis which was 
appropriate for the questions which we had used. Although it was 
desireable to have ordinal or interval level data, it was discovered that 
the initial attribution question as well as the important question were 
both nominal level. For this reason a series of Chi squares were 
performed on these two dependent variables. Since the other dependent 
variables were scales, a series of Analyses of Variance as well as Post 
Hoc T- Tests were performed. 
While initial Chisquares run for the attribution variable yielded 
significant findings,an important error was found on the scale itself. It 
was found that a built in wording factor could have biased the results 
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which were obtained. This error ractor had to do with the directionality 
or the response. That is the wording of the attribution question was 
biased in such a way as to force a subject who succeeded to attribute 
causality to the task. This would have been their only logical 
alternative, since it was the only dimension which was not negatively 
worded. It would make no sense from the subject's standpoint to attribute 
success to bad luck, lack of effort, or lack of ability (see appendix 9 
for actual bias). Keeping this fact in mind we felt that it would have 
been misleading to report such data because although the numbers were 
significant, the significance was a result of the error. 
The first meaningful analysis is located on table one. This is an 
analysis of variance which within its interaction s~ries is testing for 
hypotheses one and two. Reminding the reader who may have forgotten them, 
these two hypotheses are: 
1. When succeeding at a given task and when given a choice among 
tasks to perform, men will attribute causality internally while 
women will attribute causality externally and 
2. When failing at a given task and when given a choice among tasks 
to perform, women will attribute causality internally while men 
will attribute causality externally. 
In order to perform the following two ANOVAs both of the response sets 
were collapsed into 2 directional scales as per Weiner et. al. That is, 
on table one the 4 attributional dimensions were collapsed into 
internal/external while on table three the responses were collapsed into 
stable/unstable. 
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TABLE 1 
Analysis of variance with internal/external locus or control as the dependent variable. 
SOURCE OF VARIATION 
MAIN EFFECTS 
SEX 
TOLD 
CHOICE 
WHAT 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 
SEX TOLD 
SEX CHOICE 
SEX WHAT 
TOLD CHOICE 
TOLD WHAT 
CHOICE WHAT 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 
SEX TOLD CHOICE 
SEX TOLD WHAT 
SEX CHOICE WHAT 
TOLD CHOICE WHAT 
4-WAY INTERACTIONS 
SEX TOLD CHOICE WHAT 
EXPLAINED 
RESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
SUH OF 
SQUARES 
1.363 
.303 
.877 
.001 
.089 
1.727 
.293 
.020 
.371 
.113 
.396 
.161 
.940 
.062 
.193 
.251 
.515 
.181 
.181 
4.211 
9.779 
13.990 
DF 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
9 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
7 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
22 
73 
95 
SIGNIF 
F OFF 
2.035 
2.262 
6.551 
.007 
.331 
1.432 
2.189 
.146 
1.384 
.844 
1.478 
.600 
1.003 
.464 
.120 
.937 
1.923 
1.354 
1.354 
1.429 
.084 
.137 
.013 
.934 
.719 
.190 
.143 
.704 
.257 
.361 
.235 
.552 
.437 
.498 
.490 
.397 
.154 
.248 
.248 
.130 
Looking first at the main effects on table 1, the results indicate a 
significant main effect for what outcome the subject was told on 
attribution of causality, F:6.551, df= 1/95, p<.013. This result seems to 
indicate that the outcome of which the subject was informed had a direct 
effect on attribution. Further analysis of thi_s main effect indicated 
significant differences between the two outcome groups for attribution 
(as seen on table 2). 
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TABLE 2 
Post Boo T-Test selecting out for outcome of which subject were informed 
tor mean attribution. 
GROUP 
SUCCESS 
FAILURE 
HEAN 
1 .0698 
1 .2642 
KEAN DIFF T VALUE T PROB 
2.538 .013 
Table two indicates that there were significant differences in terms 
of what individual's attributed causality to depending upon the outcome 
they were informed of. The results indicate that those who were told that 
they succeeded were more likely to attribute causality externally than 
those who failed. 
The above result was the only significant finding from this particular 
anova. Of concern to the present study is the fact that no significant 
interaction effect was found for the sex, told and choice analysis. This 
lack of significance directly affects hypotheses one and two. That is the 
two critical hypotheses mentioned above focus on interaction effects in 
order to explain attribution of causality. But there was still one avenue 
to explore in terms of the attribution problem. Since, Weiner et. el. 
proposed a stable/ unstable direction in attribution the idea was 
entertained that maybe this is where the interaction of interest would be 
found. 
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TABLE 3 
Analysis of variance with stable/unstable dimension as the dependent 
variable. 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SUH OF SIGHIF 
SQUARES DF F OFF 
HAIN EFFECTS 
.785 5 1.187 .324 SEX 
.188 1 1.417 .238 TOLD 
.548 1 4.139 .046 
CHOICE 
.035 1 .266 .608 
WHAT 
.019 2 .072 .931 
.,. 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 2.078 9 1.745 .094 
SEX TOLD 
.424 1 3.208 .077 
SEX CHOICE 
.085 1 .642 .426 
SEX WHAT 
.301 2 1.137 .326 
TOLD CHOICE 
.291 1 1.657 .202 
TOLD WHAT 
.909 2 3.742 .028 
CHOICE WHAT 
.514 2 1.943 .151 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 
.119 1 .128 
-996 SEX TOLD CHOI CE 
.025 1 .192 .663 
SEX TOLD WHAT 
.016 2 .061 .941 
SEX CHOICE WHAT 
.007 2 .027 .973 
TOLD CHOICE WHAT 
.031 2 .015 .891 
4-WAY INTERACTIONS 
.o 15 1 .111 .740 
SEX TOLD CHOICE WHAT .o 15 1 .111 .740 
EXLAINED 2.997 22 1.029 .442 
R~IDUAL 9.660 73 TOTAL 12 .6 56 
The results found on table three are similar to the ones found on 
table one. First when looking at the main effects, a significant 
difference is found again for the told variable in terms of attribution, 
F:4.139, df= 1/95, p<.046. This result seem to indicate that there were 
significant differences between people given success and failure outcomes 
and to what they attributed cauality. As indicated by table four, futher 
analysis of the data indicated that those who were told that they 
succeeded {group 1) made more stable attributions then those who were 
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told that they tailed. 
TABLE -
Post Boo T-Test with Stable/Unstable as the dependent variable. 
GROUP MEAN MEAN DIFF T VALUE T PROB 
SUCCESS 1 .0689 
FAILURE 1.2264 
.1566 2.130 .036 
All other main effects were not significant for the stable/ unstable 
attribution analysis. When looking at the interaction effects on table 
four a significant 2 way interaction is found. When testing the combined 
effects of what outcome the individual was told plus what task the 
subject performed significant differences in attribution were found 
between the experimental groups, F:3.742, df= 2/94, p<.028. A futher 
analysis of this interaction effect, yielded the following information as 
seen on table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Post Hoc T-test looking at interaction effects for stable/unstable 
dimension. 
GROUP MEAN MEAN DIFF T VALUE T PROB 
TOLD SUCCESS 1.0698 
TOLD FAILED 1.2264 
.4878 2.238 .028 
WORDTASK SUCCEED 1.0000 
WORDTASK FAILED 1.2800 
.2800 2.575 .012 
WORDTASK SUCCEED 1.0000 
SCIENCE FAILED 1.3333 
.3333 2.321 .023 
SCIENCE SUCCEED 1.0000 
WORDTASK FAILED 1.2800 
.2800 3.055 .005 
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On table tive the values which were significant tor this particular 
• 
interaction are seen. The table indicates that or 15 possible 
experimental combinations, the four experimental combinations above were 
all significantly different at .050 level (using Duncan procedure). The 
first contrast comparison was a combined comparison testing whether there 
were differences between those who succeeded and those who failed 
independent of task performed for attribution of causality. The results 
indicated that there were significant differences t= 2.238, p<.028. This 
finding indicates that those who were given a success outcome 
(independent of task) were more likely to attribute their outcome to 
stable sources then those who were told they failed (independent of task. 
The second contrast finding was that there were significant differences 
between those who did the word group task and succeeded (group 1) and 
those who did the word group task and failed (group 4) for attribution of 
causality, t= 2.575, p<.012. This result indicates that those who did the 
word group task and were told they succeeded made more stable 
attributions then those who did the word group task and were told that 
they failed. 
The third significant contrast was comparing those who did the word 
group task and were told that they succeeded (group 1) versus those who 
did the scientific formula task and were told that they failed (group 6), 
for attribution of causality. The results indicated that a significant 
difference in attribuition did occur when comparing the two groups, t= 
2.321, p<.023. Those who did the word group task and succeeded attributed 
causality to a more stable source then those who did the scientific 
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tormula task and were told that they railed. 
The final contrast or significance was comparing those who did the 
scientific formula task and were told they succeeded (group 3) versus 
those who did the word group task and were told that they railed (group 
4), in terms of attribution of causality. The results indicate that 
there were significant differences between the two groups, t=3.055, 
p<.005. Those who did the scientific formula task and were told that they 
succeeded were more likely then those who did they word group task and 
were told they failed, to attribute causality to stable sources. 
The level of importance variable assessed the relative importance to 
subjects of choosing among task alternatives versus succeeding or failing 
at a task. Since the assessment was made using a nominal scale, a McNemar 
test for pairs of Dichotomous variables were used. This test is 
specifically aimed at the looking at the third and fourth hypotheses. 
They are: 
3. For all individuals (regardless of sex) opportunity to choose 
among task alternatives is more important than succeeding or 
failing at the task. 
4. When receiving no choice among task alternatives, individuals 
will perceive choice as being more important than the outcome. 
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TABLE 6 
HoNemar test for pairs of dichotomous variables. 
Table is looking at what is more important to individual across sex. 
IMPORTANT 
SUCCESS 
FAILURE 
CHOICE 
NOCHOICE 
SEX 
FEMALE MALE 
25 25 
26 19 CASES 
CHI SQUARE 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Table six is directly assessing the third proposed hypothesis. 
95 
21.7872 
.0000 
Analysis of table six can be performed in two ways. First, if we analyize 
for outcome only, the data indicates that the third hypothesis was not 
directly supported. Outcome was more important to significantly more 
people than choice of tasks. 
The other direction to look is comparing for what was important across 
the sexes. While outcome had an equal distribution across males and 
females, significantly more females than males thought that choice was 
more important than outcome. What will be tested next is to find out 
exactly where these significances lie. 
TABLE 7 
McNemar test for sex by level of importance if subjects had no choice. 
IMPORTANT 
FEMALE 
SUCCESS 
FAILURE 
13 
CHOICE 
NOCHOICE 15 
SEX 
MALE 
1 1 
8 N 47 
BINOMIAL 2-TAIL .3833 
Table seven is assessing hypothesis four. The data indicates that 
there is no significant difference for individuals who were forced to 
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perform one ot the tasks tor what they thought was more important. Ve 
round it neooessary to also test the other direction; that is whether 
subjects who received a choice thought that choice was more important. !a 
can be seen rrom the data on table eight, this is not the case. It seems 
that choice alone did not influence what subjects said was more 
important. In hopes of finding out specifically where the significance 
lay, many more McNemar tests were run comparing sex and importance for 
combinations of the independent variables. Upon inspection of these 
results no other significances resulted. For this reason this data has 
not been included. 
TABLE 8 
McNemar test for sex of the individual by importance if subjects had a 
choice. 
IMPORTANT 
SUCCESS 
FAILURE 
CHOICE 
NOCHOICE 
FEMALE 
13 
10 
MALE 
8 
17 N 48 
BINOMIAL 2-TAIL .5847 
The final Anova, looks at the level of responsibility dependent 
variable. The level of responsiblity was measured in a standard Likert 
type scale measure which was multipolar; that is there were three levels 
of responsiblity which a person could "perceive" as being. For this 
reason an analysis of variance was performed on the data, the results of 
which are found on table 9. There is a very important point in including 
this independent variable. In much of the past attribution literature, 
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there has been an attempt to link level or responsibility with 
attribution or causality (ie: Luginbuhl, 1972). With the problem or the 
bias built into the attribution measure, inclusion of the responsibility 
variable was a •godsend". That is, it enabled an unbiased testing of the 
internal/external dimension which the attribution measure was unable to 
give. 
TABLE 9 
Analysis of variance for the perceived level or responsibilty for the 
outcome. 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SUM OF SIGNIF 
SQUARES DF F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 9.207 5 3.947 .003 
SEX 
.068 1 .147 .703 
TOLD 7 .357 1 15.770 .000 
CHOICE 
.488 1 1.047 .310 
WHAT 1.249 2 1.339 .269 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 3.842 9 .915 .517 
SEX TOLD 
.o 13 1 .028 .868 
SEX CHOICE 
.000 1 .001 .982 
SEX WHAT 
.813 2 .871 .423 
TOLD CHOICE 
.525 1 1.125 .292 
TOLD WHAT 
.133 2 .143 .867 
. 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 3.850 1 1.179 .326 
SEX TOLD CHOICE 
.136 1 .290 .592 
SEX TOLD WHAT 1.478 2 1.584 .212 
SEX CHOICE WHAT 
.016 2 .017 .983 
TOLD CHOICE WHAT 
.765 2 .820 .445 
4-WAY INTERACTIONS 
.141 1 .302 .584 
SEX TOLD CHOICE WHAT .141 1 .302 .584 
EXPLAINED 17 .040 22 1.660 .056 
RESIDUAL 33.592 72 
TOTAL 50.632 94 
Initial analysis of the data which was found on table 9 indicated that 
the only main effect which was significant was for the told variable. The 
table indicates that significance as being F= 15.770, df:1/94, p(.000. 
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Further analysis of the told variable for the level of responsiblity is 
found on table 10. Using an individual t- test because of testing for a 
main effect, table 10's 
TABLE 10 
Post hoc analysis looking at outcome subjects were informed of for 
perceived level of responsibility. 
GROUP MEAN 
TOLD SUCCEED 1.5349 
TOLD FAILED 2 .0 96 2 
MEAN DIFF 
.5613 
T VALUE T PROB 
4.08 .000 
results indicate that subjects who were told that they succeeded (group 
1) felt more responsible for their outcome then subjects who were told 
that they failed at the task (group 2). 
Since attribution and level of responsibility have been linked 
previously, the next step was to compare their results. Upon comparison 
of the Anova's found on table 1 and 9, a similar significant main effect 
is found for the told variable. The told variable thus acted as a 
significant influence on what individuals attributed causality as well as 
to the level of responsility they felt for the outcome. The question 
which next arose was where this significance actually lie. Since the 
problem with the attribution measure lie with individuals who has 
succeeded, results for only individuals who failed were analyzed. 
Inspection of the four analysis of variance indicated that there were no 
significant main or interactive effects for either variable. 
VI. Discussion- While findings in much of the literature indicate sex 
differences in attribution (Nicholls, 1975; Zuckerman, Larrance, Porac 
and Blanck, 1980; Campbell and Hackett, 1986; Frieze, 1981; Feather and 
Simon, 1973 and Feldman-Summers and Kiesler, 1974),the present study 
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round no such ertects. As to the hypotheses themselves, no significant 
ditrerenoes occur between men and women in terms or attribution or 
causality, when manipulating choice and success or failure. There 
are three possible explanations which are available to explain the lack 
of support. First, there exist no interaction effect between the three 
for attribution; that is the three in conjuction with each other do not 
influence attribution of causality in the least. 
The second possible explanation for a lack of support has to do with 
the manipulations themselves. Even though the manipulation checks proved 
that choice and the outcomes were perceived, it may be that their 
influence on the subjects was minimal so that when they responded they 
were responding on the dependent measures based on some other influencing 
factors. That is, perhaps they were responding based upon the influence 
of some extraneous variable and not to the choice or outcome 
manipulation. 
The final explanation for the lack of support has to do with a very 
noticeable design problem. Upon closer inspection of the dependent 
measures it was found that the attribution variable was skewed toward the 
negative. That is instead of putting as the response set task, effort, 
luck and ability, the question was worded in such a way as to force the 
subject to responded to a success by attributing causality to the task. 
What this forced the subjects to do when they had to answer was choose 
the task answer since it was the only available one which was unbiased. 
Subjects were forced to take the task response many times because it was 
the only response which did not place blame on self (bad luck on your 
49 
~ . 
' ,(
jl 
" ; 
1; 
A . 
,. 
{ 
~; 
part, lack of effort on your part or lack or ability on your part). Thus, 
the findings about attribution are all 1n question. 
As to the third hypothesis, the results on table 6 indicate that 
choice was not more important then outcome overall. But, there were 
significantly more women than men who said that choice was more 
important. When attempting to see where this significance lay, no 
signifcant results were obtained. That is, although overall 
significance was found, attempting to isolate its exact location proved 
fruitless. The significance itself lay in the overall analysis. 
The finding for the responsibility dependent variable is in direct 
line with previous research; the more positive an outcome is, the higher 
the level of perceived responsiblity for the outcome. Maybe choice lies 
within the level of responsibility. Could it be that by changing choice 
(making it more clear) one can effect the level of perceived reponsiblity 
as well as what is perceived as as important to the subject? Futher 
research is needed to answer this question. 
While the responsibility variable did act as a check for the 
attribution variable, attempting to control for the effect of outcome did 
not yield significant results. The finding of any significant results 
could have compensated for the measurement error. By comparing the 
results for internal/external attribution to level of responsibility, a 
similar significant main effect of outcome was found. But attempting to 
control for outcome yielded no significant results. This points to the 
fact that in this study outcome was the key independent variable. Why 
did the outcome variable have such a profound influence on the 
dependent variables? 
50 
,. I ''I' .,• ./,,, I I 
I ' 
' ' . 
I 
'>' ,.,.~ - • .. , 
Perhaps, the choice manipulation was not strong enough. That is, 
although the manipulation check indicated that choice was perceived, it 
may not have had as great an effect on the dependent variables as was 
hoped. 
Secondly, the tasks themselves could have been cause for the impact of 
the outcome manipulation. While the tasks were similar to ones used in 
previous studies, they cannot be called "thrilling" by any standards. 
The quality of the tasks could have thus caused subjects to focus instead 
on the outcome only. 
In line with this reasoning, is the fact that outcome was directly 
manipulated. Unlike the Zuckerman et. al. research, subjects were not 
made to infer about success or failure. The success or failure 
manipulation was administered directly. This could be the chief cause for 
the significant impact of outcome. 
Finally, the population in question could have influenced the impact of 
the outcome variable. Two factors to consider here are the level of SES 
of the undergraduates as well as the attitude about success and failure 
which this institution seems to foster. These two factors could have 
biased subjects perceptions of the independent variables. That is, 
perhaps individuals with a more solid financial backround in 
general, see outcome as more important than choice. Thus even though 
exposed to a choice manipulation, they perceive the result of their 
behavior as the most important variable. Also, the entrepreneurial 
reputation Lehigh University possesses is well known. Since, 
entrepreneurial mentality and success seem to go hand in hand, one can 
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see why outcome could have had such an important effect in this study. 
Future researchers should be aware of this in future replication 
attempts. It may be important to replicate this study on two university 
campuses controlling for this effect. 
Since choice waa the key variable of exploration in this study, future 
research should address further the polarities of choice. The problem of 
"between" versus "within" task choice needs further exploration. They 
seem very distinct. Since I was manipulating "within task choice" only, 
it maybe important to manipulate both "within" and "between" task choice 
independetly and interactively within one study. That way one can test 
for the main and interactive effects under the same control situations. 
One last problem or reccomendation I see for future choice research. In 
my study all subjects did receive a choice. This is because in the 
beginning of the experimental session all subjects filled out an informed 
consent waiver. Built into this waiver is the opportunity for the subject 
to freely choose to quit the experiment at any time. Since one of the 
experimental stimuli was choice, a possible confounding or contamination 
may have occured. Future choice researches should be aware of this 
factor and attempt to develop a means to alleviate this problem. The 
choice is up to you. 
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Appendix 1 
INFORMED CONSENT 
hereby agree to serve as a subject in 
the research project (investigating TASKS) entitled "TASKS" which is 
being conducted by Scott Onuschak under the supervision of Professor 
Robert Rosenwein. 
I understand that the study involves subjects having to explain 
outcomes. 
I understand that the risks are minimal. Subjects will be asked to 
perform a task which is not life threatening, or physically strenuous. 
It has been explained to me that the purpose of the study is to have 
subjects explain the causes of why things happen to them. I have been 
informed that I may not receive any direct benifit from participating in 
this study, but I have the satisfaction in knowing that my participation 
may help to increase knowledge which may help to benifit others in the 
future. 
Scott Onuschak has offered to answer any questions I may have about 
the study and about what is expected of me in the study. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from participation in the 
study at any time without jeopardizing my relationship with Lehigh 
University. 
I have read all of the information and understand it. 
Date 
-------
If you experience any problems that are of a result of your 
participation in this study, please contact Richard Streeter, Office of 
Research, Lehigh University, 861-3020. 
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Instructions: Read 
of the word groups 
Appendix 2 
WORD GROUPS 
over the following 
as you can. 
sheet and try to remember 
1.BEE-------------------------------------------------HONEY 
2.DOG---------~---------------------------------------CAT 
3.DOOR------------------------------------------------WINDOW 
4.GLOVE-----------------------------------------------MITTEN 
5.PEN-------------------------------------------------PENCIL 
6.MAN-------------------------------------------------WOMAN 
7.CAR-------------------------------------------------GARAGE 
8.FINGER----------------------------------------------HAND 
9.PAPER-----------------------------------------------BOOK 
10.MARRIAGE--------------------------------------------DIVORCE 
11 .POLLEN----------------------------------------------ALLERGY 
12.GUN-------------------------------------------------CASE 
13.HAT-------------------------------------------------HEAD 
14.FLOOR-------------------------------------~---------CEILING 
15.FOOT------------------------------------------------SHOE 
16.WOOD------------------------------------------------TILE 
17.GIRL------------------------------------------------BOY 
18.LOVE------------------------------------------------HATE 
19.FORK------------------------------------------------KNIFE 
20.UP------------------------~-------------------------DOWN 
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Appendix 3 
WORLD CAPITALS 
Instructions: Read over the following sheet and try to remember as 
many or the cap! tals as you can. 
COUNTRY--------~----------------------------------------CAPITAL 
1.NEW ZELAND--------------------------------------------WELLINGTON 
2.INDIA-------------------------------------------------NEW DELHI 
3.FRANCE------------------------------------------------PARIS 
4.AFGHANISTAN-------------------------------------------KABUL 
5.MALAGASY REPUBLIC-------------------------------------TANARIVE 
6.MONGOLIA----------------------------------------------ULAN BANTOR 
7.MEXICO------------------------------------------------MEXICO CITY 
8.COLUMBIA----------------------------------------------BOGATA 
9.UNITED STATES-----------------------------------------WASHINGTON DC 
10.YUGOSLAVIA--------------------------------------------BELGRADE 
11.SAUDI ARABIA------------------------------------------MECCA 
12.HUNGARY-----------------------------------------------BUDAPEST 
13.THAILAND----------------------------------------------BANGKOK 
14.URUGUAY-----------------------------------------------MONTIVEDEO 
15.SUDAN-------------------------------------------------KHARTOUM 
16.SRI LANKA---------------------------------------------COLUMBO 
17.GREAT BRITIAN-----------------------------------------LONDON 
18.NEW GUINEA--------------------------------------------PORT MORSBEY 
19.POLAND------------------------------------------------WARSAW 
20.MALAYSIA----------------------------------------------KUALA LAMPUR 
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Appendix 4 
SCIENTIFIC FORMULAS 
Instructions: Read over the following sheet and try to remember as 
many of the formulas as you can. 
1.AlC13*NaCl----------------------------------SODIUM CHLORIDE 
2.Au(CN)3*6B20--------------------------------AURIC CYANIDE 
3.BeF2*2NaF-----------------------------------BERYLLIUM SODIUM FLORIDE 
4.B203*3H20-----------------------------------BORON OXIDE 
5.Ce2(W04)3-----------------------------------CEROUS TUNGSTATE 
. 
6.Cu3N----------------------------------------COPPER NITRIDE 
7.HBr-----------------------------------------HYDROBROMIC ACID 
8.PbS04---------------------------------------LEAD SULFATE 
9.LiC03---------------------------------------LITHIUM CARBONATE 
10.H3P02---------------------------------------PHOSPHORUS ACID 
11.K3As04--------------------------------------POTASSIUM ARSENITE 
12.AgC104--------------------------------------SILVER PERCHLORATE 
13.H2Si03--------------------------------------SILICIC ACID 
14.H2Sn03--------------------------------------STANNIC ACID 
15.W-------------------------------------------TUNGSTEN 
16.Sn------------------------------------------TIN 
17.D20-----------------------------------------HEAVY WATER 
18.Cu(HC02)2-----------------------------------CUPRIC FORMATE 
19.HS03F---------------------------------------FLUSULFONIC ACID 
20,N2H4*2HC02H---------------------------------HYDRANZINE FORMATE 
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Appendix 5 
WORD GROUP TEST 
'·' 
.. 
,;l 
Instructions: In the blank write the letter which you believe 
represents the correct response to the word which is given. 
1. BEE a. HAND 
2. DOG b. ALLERGY 
3. DOOR c. CASE 
4. CAR d. BOY 
5. MAN e. CAT 
6. PAPER f. SHOE 
7. PEN g. MARRIAGE 
8. FINGER h. WINDOW 
9. GLOVE i. TILE 
10. POLLEN j. HEAD 
11. HAT k. HONEY 
12. FLOOR 1. BOOK 
13. FOOT m. WOMAN 
14. WOOD n. MITTEN 
15. LOVE o. GARAGE 
16. GUN p. PENCIL 
17. DIVORCE q. KNIFE 
18. UP r. CEILING 
19. FORK s. HATE 
20. GIRL t. DOWN 
'-
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Appendix 6 
WORLD CAPITAL TEST 
Instructions: In the blank write the letter which you bele!ve 
represents the correct capital city. 
1.NEW ZELAND a. PARIS 
2.NEW GUINEA b. COLUMBO 
3.SRI LANKA c. KABUL 
4.HONGOLIA d. WARSAW 
5.SUDAN e. MECCA 
6.MALAGASY REPUBLIC f. MEXICO CITY 
7.COLUMBIA g. BANKOK 
8.URUGUAY h. LONDON 
9. UNITED STATES i. BOGATA 
1 O.MEXICO j. NEW DELHI 
11.GREAT BRITAIN k. TANARIVE 
12.THAILAND 1. WELLINGTON 
13.MALAYSIA m. ULAN BATOR 
14.AFGHANISTAN n. BUDAPEST 
15.SAUDI ARABIA o. PORT MORSBEY 
16.INDIA p. WASHINGTON DC 
17 .FRANCE q. BELGRADE 
18.HUNGARY r. KHARTOUM 
19.YUGOSLAVIA s. MONTIVEDEO 
20.POLAND t. KUALA LAMPUR 
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Appendix 7 
SCIERTIPIC FORMULA TBST 
Instructions: In the blank write the letter which you believe 
represents the correct name tor the tormula. 
., 
·./ 
1. AlC13•HaCl L a. HEAVY WATER .~ 
. 
,;, 
' 2. Au(CH)3•6B20 b. TUNGSTEN 
,i 
i';j 3. BeF2*2NaF LITHIUM CARBONATE ,, c. 
:! 
4. B203*3H20 d. SODIUM CHLORIDE 
~.: 
(· 
! 5. Ce2(W04)3 e. STANNIC ACID 
6. Cu3N f. FLUOSULFONIC ACID 
7. HBr g. BORON OXIDE 
8. PbS04 h. COPPER NITRIDE 
9. LiC03 i. SILVER PERCHLORATE 
1 o. H3P04 j. CUPRIC FORMATE 
11. K3As04 k. TIN 
12. H2Si03 1. AURIC CYANIDE 
13. AgC104 m. CEROUS TUNGSTATE 
14. H2Sn03 n. LEAD SULFATE 
15. w o. HYDROBROMIC ACID 
16. Sn p. BERYLLIUM FLUORIDE 
17. D20 q. HYDRAZINE FORMATE 1; 
18. Cu(HC0)2 r. POTASSIUM ARSENITE ) 
~ 19. HS03F PHOSPHORUS ACID 1:• s. .. . 
20. N2H4*2HC02H t. SILICIC ACID 
~ 
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Appendix 8 
PRE TEST 
. . 
NAME: 
Instructions: Circle or write in the answer which best reflects the 
your opinion about yourself as compared to other people. 
1. How would you do as compared to other people at 
LEARNING A SERIES OF WORD GROUPS? 
(a) much better than (b) somewhat better than (c) the same as 
(d) somewhat worse than (e) much worse than 
2. How would you do as compared to other people at 
LEARNING A SERIES OF WORLD CAPITALS? 
(a) much better than (b) somewhat better than (c) the same as 
(d) somewhat worse than (e) much worse than 
3. How would you do as compared to other people at 
LEARNING A SERIES OF SCIENTIFIC FORMULAS? 
(a) much better than (b) somewhat better than (c) the same as 
(d) somewhat worse than (e) much worse than 
your sex------- Mor F 
your age-------~~-
your race (a) Hispanic (b) Oriental (c) Black (d) Caucasian 
(e) Other (specify) 
i ,; '1 
I I 
I \ ', 
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Appendix 9 
POST TEST 
Iµ.: , ~ "ti , ! I 
Instructions: Read each question carefully and circle or write in the 
the answer where appropriate. 
1. How were you told that you did on the task? 
(a) succeeded (b) failed 
2. Where you given a choice of tasks to do? 
(a) yes (b) no 
3. Why do you think that you succeeded or failed? 
(a) some thing about the task 
(b) lack of effort on your part 
(c) bad luck 
(d) because you did not have the ability 
(e) other 
In the space provided explain your last choice 
4. Which is more important to you? 
(a) succeeding/failing at a task 
(b) having the ability to choose among tasks 
----------
Having chosen a orb now tell me why you selected it 
5. How responsible do you feel about the success or failure outcome 
which you were informed of? (a) very responsible (b) somewhat responsible 
(c) not responsible 
6. Write in the blanks 3 words to describe your success or failure • 
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Appendix 10 
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
This study is about attributions. Attributions are means by which we 
explain outcomes which happen to us in everyday life. Host previous 
studies in this area have used a three step process. Subjects have 
performed a task (task performance), were told that they succeeded or 
failed (success or failure manipulation) and were asked to explain the 
success or failure (attribution of causality for the outcome). In this 
study all of you were exposed to these three steps. But, an element was 
added to this chain. This element is task selection (t.aving the ability 
to choose ~mong choice alternati•tes). This is the rational behind having 
aome of you receive a choice while others were "forced" to perform one of 
t bft tasks. 
ln the experiment itself, an element of deception was used which must 
~\,,. clarified. Subjects were told that ':.hey had either succeeded or failed 
l t thtt task as compared to others who had previously done the task. This 
r 1ot true in that no results were actually compared. Inorder to study 
~~tr\butione for success or failure it is neccessary to do this. Previous 
1.;t ,: • 1 f'\" have used this particular technique and subjects were not harmed 
, .,-. -~ ~"t-A1ul t. of it. However if you have any concerns about this deception, 
it.'t~~· : -·-tt,! t.o discuss them with me. 
iha~ ye~ for your participation. If you are interested in the results 
r .. ~~ '!,he i:ttady or have any other questions feel free to contact me at Price 
~:11, ext. 83 816. 
THANKS AGAIN! 
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